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1. Introduction and scope of the analysis: an investigation on how Italian law, 
European law and OECD guidelines address certain main profiles of the legal regime of 
state-owned corporations and on the significance and usefulness of the OECD guidelines 
and of a global regulation of state-owned corporations. 
In this paper, we will try to address certain central and mostly debated profiles of the 
legal regime of state-owned corporations (SOCs): specifically their nature, and, as a result, 
legal regime. In doing so, we will consider, simultaneously, Italian law, European law and 
OECD guidelines on corporate governance of public enterprises.  
Such guidelines represent a set of non-binding principles and best practices on 
corporate governance of state-owned enterprises
1
 (especially, insofar as) involved in 
commercial activities
2
.  
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Our aim is, at first, to understand whether and to what extent the three systems are 
consistent and, hopefully, to reach conclusions on the nature and, so, legal regime of SOCs, 
that may be of interest also for jurisdictions other than the Italian one.  
We will also address another point: how is it actually possible and, in any case, of use 
a global regulation (although in the form of soft-law) of such profiles? And, in this 
connection, which role can play the differences among the various legal systems?  
At a first sight, in fact, legal issues posed by SOCs may certainly present a real global 
significance: in the sense of involving legal profiles that appear to be, in many cases, 
essentially similar, regardless the specific jurisdiction at stake and, secondly, because certain 
forms of SOCs, like, for example, sovereign wealth funds (SWF), have  an intuitive global 
dimension, as they normally act in a global context.   
The two areas of investigation seem strictly connected: in particular, analyzing with a 
certain degree of attention the particularities of Italian law (as influenced by European law) 
will not only offer a picture on how a given legal system addresses the main issues posed by 
SOCs and may be consistent and influenced by the guidelines, but also could help us (or to a 
certain degree may represent even a necessary step) to answer the question of the usefulness 
and practicability of a global regulation, like the guidelines prepared by OECD.  
Specifically, to the extent that the legal regime of SOCs in Italy will appear 
substantially determined by choices taken at a national (and/or European) level, this might 
indicate that a global regulation is condemned to be of limited effectiveness.  
 
2. A teleological analysis of state-owned corporations in Italy: corporatization as 
privatization. 
According to OECD guidelines, “Any obligations and responsibilities that an SOE is 
required to undertake in terms of public services beyond the generally accepted norm should 
be clearly mandated by laws or regulations. Such obligations and responsibilities should also 
be disclosed to the general public and related costs should be covered in a transparent 
manner”3.  In the annotations to the principle, OECD clarifies that the special responsibilities 
and obligations of SOCs need to be fully expressed and transparent (and in fact preferably 
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inserted in the by-laws). Also the ways by which such obligations are funded and 
compensated by the state should be transparent
4
. 
In practice, this seems to mean that, at least in general terms
5
, even when SOCs 
receive specific public law obligations or other forms of public interest binding objectives 
(such to contrast with their commercial nature), this public mandate should be clearly defined 
and should not represent  a sort of general and comprehensive objective of the entity, such to 
be imposed without clear and definite criteria and limitations. It is not entirely clear, 
however, whether and to what extent a duty of compensation exists (or whether, insofar as 
compensations are paid, simply they need to be adequately disclosed). 
Principle III.A, then, prescribes that “The co-ordinating or ownership entity and SOEs 
should ensure that all shareholders are treated equitably” and principle VI.A lays down that 
“The board should be fully accountable to the owners, act in the best interest of the company 
and treat all shareholders equitably”. Indeed, an equitable treatment of all shareholders and a 
duty for the board to act in the best interest of the corporation (as opposed to the interest of a 
specific shareholder
6
) seems difficult to harmonize with a system in which a certain group of 
shareholders (i.e. that of public entities) is in condition to impose its own specific interests, 
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 See in particular, the relative annotation, at p. 20: “In some cases SOEs are expected to fulfil special 
responsibilities and obligations for social and public policy purposes. In some countries this includes a 
regulation of the prices at which SOEs have to sell their products and services. These special responsibilities 
and obligations may go beyond the generally accepted norm for commercial activities and should be clearly 
mandated and motivated by laws and regulations. They should also preferably be incorporated in the company 
by-laws. The market and the general public should be clearly informed about the nature and extent of these 
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contracts. Compensation should be structured in a way that avoids market distortion. This is particularly the 
case if the enterprises concerned are in competitive sectors of the economy”. 
The right of a compensation (for the costs or losses imposed for pursuing public goals) seems also 
mentioned at p. 37: “the government should not use SOEs to further goals which differ from those which apply 
to the private sector, unless compensated in some form. Any specific rights granted to stakeholders or influence 
on the decision making process should be explicit. Whatever rights granted to stakeholders by the law or special 
obligations that have to be fulfilled by the SOE in this regard, the company organs, principally the general 
shareholders meeting and the board, should retain their decision making powers”. 
5
 In reality, as we will show, the OECD’s view appears less clear, as especially emerging from the draft 
implementation guide subsequently published. 
6
 The same problem has been discussed also in USA. See SCHWARTZ, Governmentally Appointed 
Directors in a Private Corporation – The Communications Satellite Act of 1962, in Harvard Law Rev., 79, 
1965, 350, 361 ss., where, after the observation that “The Presidential nominee is a corporate director, and 
under traditional corporate principles has a primary obligation to shareholders”, the risk of conflicts of interest 
is analyzed, with specific regard to the event of the “…much discussed question of extending service to less 
profitable underdeveloped areas”.  
In Italy, see, basically, SENA, Problemi del cosiddetto azionariato di Stato: l’interesse pubblico come 
interesse extrasociale, in Riv. soc., 1958, 43 and  ASQUINI, I battelli del Reno, in Riv. soc., 1959, 620, 622. 
 
 
 4 
even when in contrast with the corporation’s interest and so in conflict with the common 
interest of all the shareholders.   
To fully understand the potential significance of these principles in a Italian and then 
in a global perspective as well the intrinsic importance of the teleological profile in the legal 
regime of SOCs, at first we will investigate whether and to what extent Italian law recognizes 
and protect the common economic interests of the shareholder, so characterizing SOCs as a 
lucrative-for profit (of every and any shareholder) enterprise. 
a. The primary significance of the legal purpose, for the purpose of understanding the 
nature of a legal entity. 
Indeed, the first point to be discussed seems to be the legal (and so mandatory) 
purpose of SOCs. It should not be too difficult to agree, in fact, that the primary and most 
significant feature of any legal entity is the purpose legally given, if any. The legislative 
choice of providing an entity with a specific purpose, in particular, characterizes all it legal 
regime (that should be consistent with such legal option): in principle it represents the key 
element around which any profile of the entity’s regime is built and, so, is to be interpreted, 
in case of doubt.  
In relation to SOCs, furthermore, the legal purpose of the entity seems such to 
determine also its substantial nature (as opposed to a merely legal-formal regime), as far as it 
involves and describes also its economic mission, i.e. its necessary (as legally required) 
economic behavior. Moreover, since in Italy
7
 one of the primary criteria by which classifying 
an entity as public or private law one is, traditionally, the fact of being established for 
pursuing a  private or public-general purpose, it is well clear that when a given entity pursues 
a strictly egoistic purpose, like profits to be distributed to its shareholders, it is impossible (or 
at least very difficult) to attribute to this entity a public law nature. Indeed, such type of 
purposes is, (we would say) by definition, a not public-general-altruistic one. Therefore, it is 
not even necessary to discuss whether, in view of the difficulty of individuating which 
purposes are public by nature, the teleological approach may really be considered the most 
appropriate and effective in the attempt of identifying an entity as a private or public. In fact, 
if we just agree that a public entity needs to be directly devoted to a public and general 
interest (as opposed to the specific interest of a restricted group of individuals, like, for 
example, the shareholders of a corporation), when an (undoubtedly) egoistic purpose is 
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legally assigned, the concerned entity is a private law one. And this regardless whether, in 
general terms, the teleological approach may be deemed as an effective criteria for 
distinguishing among private and public entities      
b. Sect. 2247 of Italian civil code (lucrative purpose) and its (persistent) systematic 
significance, as confirmed by art. 90, par. 17, law no. 289 of 2002. 
The legal purpose established by sect. 2247 of Italian civil code is strictly egoistic: 
“with the agreement setting up a corporation, two or more persons contribute goods or 
services for the common exercise of an economic activity, with the aim of sharing the relative 
profits”. This purpose, in fact, characterizes the corporations as a (necessarily) for profit (of 
all the shareholders, to which are to be distributed) entities. Thus, corporations are not only a 
neutral form of organization of a given activity. Corporations, are, on the contrary, private 
law forms of organization of economic activities susceptible of being (and intended to be) 
profitable and able to create (and maximize) value for (all) the shareholders. Someone has, 
eloquently, spoken of an even “ontological contrast” between lucrative purpose and  a 
qualification as a public entity
8
. As a result, the board is required to protect the interests of 
the corporation as a whole and not merely those of a particular dominant shareholder, as the 
majority shareholder (state or other public entity, in the SOCs): profits (and other economic 
achievements, creating value for shareholders and so the conditions for future profits) 
represent the legal purpose of the entity, and such economic interests are to be, as far as 
possible, maximized. 
Is this rule applicable also to SOCs, or is it legally admissible a total or partial 
derogation, so to allow SOCs to take primarily or partially in count also general-public (for 
example social) objectives, even when in contrast with the egoistic, for profit, mission of the 
corporation? 
In Italy, this point has been extensively debated in relation to the legal regime of 
SOCs. 
In particular, in many occasions, the case-law (especially, as we will see, that of 
administrative courts) and the scholars (again, especially public lawyers) have developed 
theories according to which SOCs, in particular when established on the basis of a specific 
(public) law provision, are neutral organizations, mainly devoted to pursue public interests, 
which might lawfully prevail on the lucrative purpose. In other terms, the purpose of the 
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specific public law provision at stake is viewed to be, by these theories, as the purpose also of 
the corporation, being the two profiles strictly connected and almost  undistinguishable.  
Moreover, according to these theories, where a purpose is given by law, this would 
mean that the entity cannot decide to stop its activity and cease its existence: and this would 
be enough to characterize it as a public entity, as a legal necessity to exist and to continue to 
operate would be the main element for qualifying an entity as a of a public nature.   
These theories should be evaluated in the light of the applicable, positive, legal rules. 
Indeed, too often, opinions on SOCs (and the relative criticisms) have risked to be based on 
“natural law”’9 or even extra-juridical and political approaches, while, in reality, (at least) at a 
first stage, one should analyze whether the positive law provides answers or give indications 
on the nature of SOCs
10
. 
The ministerial report to the civil code
11
 clearly stated that,  where the state and other 
public entities decide to participate to corporations, “it is the State that subjects itself to the 
laws of corporations, to provide to its management  more effective forms and new possibility 
of achievements. The common regime of corporation shall therefore apply also to 
corporations in which the State or other public entities are shareholders without exceptions, 
unless special provisions establish the contrary”.  In other terms, corporatization, according 
to the historical intention clearly and explicitly expressed by the legislator, means not only 
promotion of higher efficiency through a more flexible organizational form, but also a clear 
choice for privatisation (i.e., for the full subjection to the private-corporation law). No doubt 
may exist, therefore, on the fact that, in the intentions of the makers of the civil code, sect. 
2247 (and of all the other private law provisions, that sect. 2247 presupposes) has to full 
apply to SOCs. 
Finally, art. 90, par. 17, law no. 289 of 2002 again clarified that “sport non 
professional corporations….may assume one of the following forms:….sport limited liability 
corporation….set up in compliance with the current provisions, with the exception of those 
establishing the lucrative purpose”. In other terms, unless thinking that the legislator is 
unaware of the basic terms of the general corporate law, we have to conclude, that, in the 
legal regime of corporations, one of the principles currently in force is the lucrative purpose. 
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 See in particolar, with various criticisms to the administrative courts’ approaches, CASSESE, Gli enti 
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Indeed, it represents the legal-mandatory purpose of corporations and exclusively in given 
cases it can be derogated, by means of special law. 
c. An implied modification of the (lucrative) legal purpose? 
However, as already observed, certain authors have argued that the specific (public) 
law provision based on which the corporation is established (obviously if and to the extent a 
specific legislative provision exists), may, impliedly, modify the legal purpose of the 
corporation, derogating from the mentioned sect. 2247, and, as a result, transforming the 
corporation in a public entity
12
.   
Indeed, in abstract, a similar derogation may well be conceived, since sect. 2247 is not 
a constitutional provision, and so it can be derogated by any subsequent legislative provision. 
Once deprived of its typical legal purpose, then, also a SOCs may well be qualified as a 
public entity in a proper sense. 
The real point, in sum, is not whether to accept or to deny, in abstract terms, such 
theoretical possibility, but to research an interpretative rule on the conditions based on which 
a legislative intention to modify the legal purpose of sect. 2247 may be reasonably identified. 
In this respect, what seems unacceptable is the approach under which from the mere fact that 
a given SOC is legally intended to perform activities that, at least to a certain degree, are of 
public interest (for example performing a public service) infers, per se, a modification of its 
legal purpose.  
In fact, it is absolutely common and understandable that SOCs are set up with the aim 
of performing an activity of a certain public interest. Art. 3, par. 27, of the budget law for 
2008
13
 has even expressly established  that, “for the purpose of safeguarding competition and 
market”, traditional public administrations “are not allowed to set up corporations involved 
in the production of goods and services not strictly necessary for pursuing their own 
institutional objectives…”. 
However, it almost does not exist any activity (apart, perhaps, the so called public 
good in a strict sense) that is not, per se, susceptible of a profitable management.  Thus, it 
cannot be inferred from the activity in which the corporation is (even on the basis of a legal 
duty) involved, any sufficiently clear indication on whether the corporation is, contrary to and 
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in derogation from sect. 2247, a non profit one. In other terms, the legal purpose of SOC 
cannot be confused with the activity in which it is involved
14
. 
d. The 2003 reform of corporate law and the confirmation of the entrepreneurial and 
for profit nature of all the corporations (also when in the hands of the State and other public 
authorities). 
In a legal system, like the Italian one, in which the civil code plays a primary role in 
establishing the main principles of corporate law, we have now to examine whether 
subsequent amendments to civil code might justify (different) conclusions in the sense of a 
neutral (and not for-profit) nature of corporations, and, in particular, of SOCs. 
In particular, in 2003
15
, the law of corporations has been extensively reformed. 
However, this reform, generally intended to introduce a higher flexibility in the corporate 
law, has expressly been in the direction of an even higher degree of entrepreneurial 
characterization of corporations. In particular, it is worth mentioning that legal principles on 
the basis of which the reform has been drafted, provided, among others aspects, for a 
promotion of the “entrepreneurial character of the corporation”16 and for a “profitable 
management of the  corporation’s enterprise”.17 
And in fact, also with specific regard to SOCs, one of the main innovation is probably 
represented by the new sect. 2497 of the civil code, under which “corporations and entities 
that, exercising activities of direction and coordination of corporations, act in their own or of 
third parties interest violating principles of fair corporate and entrepreneurial management, 
are directly responsible toward  the shareholders for the prejudice created to the profitability 
and the value of the equity participation, as well as toward the corporate creditors for the 
damages caused to the integrity of the corporate assets”. 
As stated in the ministerial explanatory report to the 2003 reform, among the interests 
that sect. 2497 is intended to guarantee, there is  the right of minority shareholders to 
dividends, expressly defined as “one of the essential value of the equity participation to 
corporations” 18. 
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 On the necessity of a clear distinction in SOCs between “causa” (legal purpose) and “oggetto 
sociale” (activity concretely performed to pursue the lucrative purpose), see CAMMEO, Società commerciale ed 
ente pubblico, Firenze, 1947, 28-29. 
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 Legislative decree no. 6 of 2003. 
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 Art. 1, lett. b, of law no. 366 of 2001. 
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On the rationale of the new form of liability, see also SACCHI, Sulla responsabilità da direzione e 
coordinamento nella riforma delle società di capitali, in Giur. comm., 2003, 661, according to which the 
legislator was influenced by the (American) principle of the so called “shareholder value” (664). 
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The main reason of interest for us rests in the fact that such provision - that manifestly 
implies and better protects the lucrative nature of the corporations (as not only stated in the 
explanatory report but also made evident by the literal reference to the profitability of the of 
the participation) - is applicable to any type of entities (comprising public entities), when they 
are majority (or in any other form dominant) shareholders of corporations. This means that 
the duty to preserve the “profitability” of the enterprise covers also SOCs and that the power 
of public entities, as dominant shareholder, to impose public interest objects, may be lawfully 
exercised only as far as such public interests are compatible with the profitability of 
corporations. It is true that a subsequent law provision of 2009
19
 has expressly exempted the 
state from the liability introduced by sect. 2497, but, apart from the fact that such exclusion 
makes even clearer (in terms of a contrario interpretation) that the other public entities 
different from the state (for example local authorities, or regions) are certainly subject to sect. 
2497, it appears a provision in contrast with European law and so to not be applied, as we 
will see. 
Moreover, such exception seems in conflict with the principles of equitable treatment 
laid down by the OECD
20
. In fact, a real equitable treatment implies not only equal rights, 
but, symmetrically, also equal duties and obligations. In this perspective, the common 
liabilities ordinarily established for any other dominant shareholder should apply to the State, 
which, like any dominant shareholder, should not exercise its powers for purposes different 
from the common benefit of all the shareholders and so of the corporation. 
e. Recent legal provisions which reinforce the for profit nature of SOC. 
Lastly, the lucrative nature of SOCs has received a new and eloquent confirmation by 
a just passed law provision
21
 that, with the aim of ensuring savings for the state treasury, lays 
down that, unless specifically authorized by a prime minister’s decree in connection to 
serious reasons of public interests,  public entities are prohibited from refinancing 
corporations that, in the last three financial years, have been losing money. The same law 
decree, in extending limitations to consultancy and sponsoring agreements applicable to 
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 Art. 19, law decree no. 78 of 2009. 
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make decisions in general shareholders meetings without the agreement of any other shareholders. It is usually 
in a position to decide on the composition of the board of directors. While such decision making power is a 
legitimate right that follows with ownership, it is important that the state doesn’t abuse its role as a dominant 
shareholder, for example by pursuing objectives that are not in the interest of the company and thereby to the 
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public entities also to certain categories of corporations
22
 under their dominance, prescribes 
that the economic savings so realized should be, in principle, assigned to the public 
shareholder, in form of profits. Again, this means that also SOCs should (at least, in the 
normality of cases) produce dividends, and so, far from being neutral instruments by which 
non-profit purposes are and may lawfully been pursued, are required, like the other 
corporations, to aim at conducting a lucrative activity. 
f. Constitutional principles in the sense of the for profit nature of SOC. 
But also from a constitutional standpoint, certain relevant principles might be 
invoked, so to defend the lucrative nature of SOCs in Italy. In particular, under art. 23 of 
constitution, “no personal or pecuniary obligations may be imposed, unless provided for by 
law”. According to art. 97 of constitution, public administrations are to be organized on the 
basis and pursuant to law provisions. 
Art. 23 is relevant since it makes it unconstitutional any general (and not specifically 
grounded on law
23
) imposition to private shareholders of economic sacrifices in view of the 
public interest: and economic sacrifices are also those to which private shareholders would be 
subject, as a result of a hypothetical general (and unwritten) principle according to which 
SOCs may pursue public interest, also when in contrast with the profitability of the 
enterprise. In this respect, it is well clear the consistency between this interpretation of art. 23 
of constitution and OECD requirement that general interest’s obligations shall be mandated to 
SOCs only insofar as specifically and transparently declared and imposed. However, under 
art. 23, not only the sacrifices are to be transparent, but also grounded on a clear and 
sufficiently detailed legislative provision: in other terms, not simply based on a different 
(more informal or in any case not legislative) statement of objectives (for example, a 
provision of the by-laws or other sources of “soft law”, even of public law nature, like 
ministerial guidelines or similar provisions). 
Art. 97 is relevant, insofar as it requires that the qualification of an entity as a public 
body (as such certainly belonging to the administration and so an instrument of its 
organization) is based on a decision of the legislator, and not on the mere factual 
circumstance that a private law entity is under a public entity dominance and involved in an 
activity of public interest.    
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Finally, such constitutional principles should also suggest a prudential interpretation 
of the laws establishing SOCs: in order to avoid an elusion of arts. 23 and 97, before 
concluding for a not-for profit nature of the specific SOC at stake, one should look for clear 
(and not debatable and equivocal) legal directions. In other terms, the relevance of the 
mentioned constitutional principles is not just that of excluding that a public interest purpose 
may be arbitrarily mandated to a SOCs without any law base, but also that of prescribing that 
SOCs established by law cannot be viewed as not for profit-ones merely based on the fact 
that the legislator mandates that they are involved in an activity of specific public relevance. 
By contrast, in absence of different, unequivocal, legislative indications, we should deem that 
where a given public law provision refer to a corporation, it wants to apply the civil code, and 
thus to have the SOC fully governed by private law and, as a result, (also) by sect. 2247. 
g) European law principles in the sense of a private and for profit nature of SOCs. 
The opinion according to which SOCs would not be (necessarily) for profit entities, it 
is strictly connected to a more general theory, developed in 1970s by a corporate law 
scholar
24
, who tried to demonstrate a so called general (i.e., not only related to SOCs, but 
potentially relative also to privately owned corporations) “decline” of the lucrative purpose in 
corporations. 
The criticisms that we are about to discuss in relation to this general theory, will offer 
the opportunity also to introduce the topic of the contribution that European law may provide 
on the nature and legal regime of SOCs. 
In fact, the opinion in question is essentially based on the circumstance that the 
implementation of the first EC directive on company law
25
 has eliminated any reference to 
the nullity-invalidity of the corporation, when set up in violation of its typical legal purpose
26
. 
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 SANTINI, Tramonto dello scopo lucrativo nelle società di capitali, in Riv. dir. civ.,1973, 133. This 
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 First Council Directive of 9 March 1968 on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the protection of 
the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the 
second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the 
Community (68/151/EEC). 
The directive was implemented in Italy by means of art. 3 of d.p.r. 1127 of 1969. 
26
 This as a consequence of art. 11 of Directive 68/151/EEC: “The laws of the Member States may not 
provide for the nullity of companies otherwise than in accordance with the following provisions: 1. Nullity must 
be ordered by decision of a court of law; 2. Nullity may be ordered only on the following grounds: (a) that no 
instrument of constitution was executed or that the rules of preventive control or the requisite legal formalities 
 12 
As a consequence, the agreement by which a corporation is set up would be a neutral (i.e. 
without legal purpose) one, and, thus, a not for profit-corporation would be a legally 
admissible entity, fully in conformity with the legislative requirements.  
This is not the right place to comprehensively discuss the merit of this theory. We just 
wish to note that the first EC Directive is very clear in stating that (primary) condition for its 
application is the fact that the entity at stake is a for profit one. And in fact, it makes 
reference to (and is intended to cover exclusively companies falling within the definition of) 
art. 58, par. 2, of the EC Treaty, by which ““Companies or firms” means companies or firms 
constituted under civil or commercial law, including co-operative societies, and other legal 
persons governed by public or private law, save for those which are non-profit-making”. In 
this connection, it appears frankly  a bit paradoxical that the lucrative purpose might be 
deemed “neutralized” by a national legal innovation, in reality implementing a directive, 
whose condition of applicability is, precisely, the same lucrative purpose. 
Also the second directive on corporate law
27
 may play a significant role.  
This directive has codified, in fact, the principle of equal treatment to all shareholders: 
“For the purposes of the implementation of this Directive, the laws of the Member States 
shall ensure equal treatment to all shareholders who are in the same position” (art. 42). 
Now, it is true that the principle literally regards corporate law, only insofar as specifically 
addressed by the same directive
28
.  But, the directive covers many important profiles of 
corporate law, and, among them, that of distribution of dividends
29
. In such a way, then, the 
equal of treatment (also) in relation to the right to dividend seems to receive a specific 
protection at European legislative level. 
                                                                                                                                                        
were not complied with; (b) that the objects of the company are unlawful or contrary to public policy;  (c) that 
the instrument of constitution or the statutes do not state the name of the company, the amount of the individual 
subscriptions of capital, the total amount of the capital subscribed or the objects of the company; (d) failure to 
comply with the provisions of the national law concerning the minimum amount of capital to be paid up; (e) the 
incapacity of all the founder members;  (f) that, contrary to the national law governing the company, the 
number of founder members is less than two.  Apart from the foregoing grounds of nullity, a company shall not 
be subject to any cause of non-existence, nullity absolute, nullity relative or declaration of nullity”.  
27
 Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards which, for 
the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the 
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public limited 
liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards 
equivalent. 
28
 But see JAEGER, Privatizzazioni, profili generali, in Enc. giur. Treccani, vol. XXIV, Roma, 1995, 
5, according to which the equal treatment principles would represent the base of the entire European company 
law, as such regarding any profile of this law .  
Furthermore, it seems certainly still relevant and of central importance, since as been recently codified 
also by directive 2007/36/EC on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, whose art. 4 
established that “The company shall ensure equal treatment for all shareholders who are in the same position 
with regard to participation and the exercise of voting rights in the general meeting”. 
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This means, in practice, that a system under which the common interest of all the 
shareholders may be sacrificed in view of the public interest (i.e., in view of the interest of a 
specific shareholder) would be of (at least debatable) conformity even with the equal 
treatment principle, as codified by art. 42 of Directive 77/91/EEC. In particular, it seems easy 
to agree that imposition by the majority shareholder of an economic sacrifice to the 
corporation with the aim of better pursuing the general-public interest, does not simply 
represent a way by which the state may “gain from the corporation’s activities, in ways that 
other shareholders cannot”30, but is substantially equivalent to an anticipated distribution of 
dividends in a disproportional way.  
But the potential contribution of European Law on the legal purpose of SOCs and 
other aspects of their regime (and in particular on an hypothetical attribution to public 
authorities as shareholders of privileged position) is even more significant. In particular, it is 
time to introduce what, so far, probably represents the major reason of interest of the 
European case-law: the golden share doctrine. 
 
3. Golden share and other privileges of the State and other public entities as 
shareholders. 
In the annotations to Chapter 3 on equitable treatment of shareholders, OECD 
suggests that “The state and state-owned enterprises should recognise the rights of all 
shareholders and in accordance with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance ensure 
their equitable treatment and equal access to corporate information”. This with the 
consequence that “governments should, as far as possible, limit the use of Golden Shares and 
disclose shareholders’ agreements and capital structures that allow a shareholder to exercise 
a degree of control over the corporation disproportionate to the shareholders’ equity 
ownership in the company”. Moreover, as to the ownership and voting structure of the 
company, according to OECD (chapter V) “It is important that the ownership and voting 
structures of SOEs are transparent so that all shareholders have a clear understanding of 
their share of cash-flow and voting rights. It should also be clear who retains legal 
ownership of the state’s shares and where the responsibility for exercising the state’s 
ownership rights are located. Any special rights or agreements that may distort the 
                                                                                                                                                        
29
 See art. 15. 
30
 We quote here the wording of GILSON & MILHAUPT, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate 
Governance: a Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, Standford Law Review, 60, 2008, 1345, 1361. 
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ownership or control structure of the SOE, such as golden shares and power of veto, should 
be disclosed”31. 
More in general, as far as possible (i.e., probably until not clearly necessary, in 
conformity to the principle of proportionality
32
), the common corporate law should be 
preserved: “When streamlining the legal form of SOEs, governments should base themselves 
as much as possible on corporate law and avoid creating a specific legal form when this is 
not absolutely necessary for the objectives of the enterprise. Streamlining of the legal form of 
SOEs would enhance transparency and facilitate oversight through benchmarking. It would 
also level the playing field with”33 . 
In other terms, the guidelines express a tendential disfavor in respect to golden shares, 
even if without assuming an absolutely negative approach. Provided that fully transparently 
publicized and justified by real public interests reasons, golden shares are, in fact, accepted. 
The European case-law on golden share is too well known to require a comprehensive 
description here. So we will shortly examine only which are, in our view, the most significant 
(especially from the Italian perspective) judgments and, most of all, the real principles we can 
derive from the European Court of Justice (ECJ), in order to understand the European basic 
requirements as to the regime of SOCs in Europe and in Italy. 
In the judgment on the Volkswagen
 
 case
34
, ECJ declared in contrast with the freedom 
of circulation of capital, a German law introducing certain privileges (derogatory from 
common corporate law) in relation to the appointment of directors and the majorities required 
for certain resolutions of the general assembly, because such  to destroy “the symmetry 
between capital strength and possibilities of participation in the management of a 
company”35. Among the other reasons why similar law provisions were deemed to create 
unacceptable restrictions to the private investments, in fact, the Court noted that “in certain 
special circumstances, the Federal and State authorities in question may use their position in 
order to defend general interests which might be contrary to the economic interests of the 
company concerned, and therefore, contrary to the interests of its other shareholders.”36. 
The specific problem of the economic impact of golden shares has been previously 
raised by a 2006 judgment, in which, again, the Court underlined the risk of deterrence 
                                                 
31
 P. 45. 
32
 In this sense in relation to OECD guidelines, see CLARICH, Società di mercato e quasi- 
amministrazioni, in www.giustizia-amministrativa.it. 
33
 P. 20 of the OECD Guidelines. 
34
 ECJ, 23 October 2007, in case C-112/05, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany. 
35
 Point 72 of the conclusions. 
36
 Point 79. 
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against private investments of the imposition, by the State, of public interest purposes, in 
contrast with the lucrative ones
37
. 
Similarly, in the judgment on the case AEM
38, the ECJ has held that “Article 56 EC 
must be interpreted as precluding a national provision, such as Article 2449 of the Italian 
Civil Code, under which the articles of association of a company limited by shares may 
confer on the State or a public body with a shareholding in that company the power to 
appoint directly one or more directors which, on its own or, as in the main proceedings, in 
conjunction with a provision such as Article 4 of Decree Law No 332 of 31 May 1994, which 
became, after amendment, Law No 474 of 30 July 1994, as amended by Law No 350 of 24 
December 2003, which grants that State or public body the right to participate in the election 
on the basis of lists of the directors it has not appointed directly, is such as to enable that 
State or public body to obtain a power of control which is disproportionate to its 
shareholding in that company”. And this notwithstanding the fact that the special rights given 
to the municipality of Milan by the by-laws (in itself a private law act, ordinarily approved by 
a resolution of the general shareholder meeting, and, thus, not an authoritative decision) were 
governed by the civil code, and, most of all, were similar to the powers that, using the 
instruments commonly available under private laws mechanisms, might have been at disposal 
of any common shareholder (for example, by means of shareholders agreements). In other 
terms, despite the fact that a disproportionate power of influence could have been obtained 
also by means of entirely common provisions of private-corporate law
39
. 
Indeed, the two cases seem particularly significant for four main reasons: 
                                                 
37
ECJ, 28 September 2006, joint cases C-282/04 e C-283/04, Commission v. Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, point 30: “the Netherlands State might exercise its special rights in order to defend general 
interests, which might be contrary to the economic interests of the company concerned. The special shares at 
issue thus entail the real risk that decisions recommended by the organs of those companies as being in the 
economic interests of the latter may be blocked by that State”. 
38
 ECJ, 6 December 2007, C-463/04 and C-464/04, Federconsumatori. 
39
 The ECJ in fact observed that “The existence of a restriction on the free movement of capital cannot 
be called in question by the arguments of the Comune di Milano and the Italian Government that, first, Article 
2449 of the Civil Code falls within the scope of ordinary company law and, secondly, the right of the Comune di 
Milano directly to appoint directors was conferred voluntarily upon it by AEM’s shareholders in general 
meeting and pursuant to a normal application of ordinary company law.  It should be stated, first, that Article 
2449 of the Civil Code enables only the State and public bodies with a shareholding in a company limited by 
shares to have the right to appoint directly one or more directors under the articles of association of that 
company. Given that, as stated in paragraph 17 of this judgment, the national court bases its reasoning on the 
premiss that the rule in Article 2449 of the Civil Code derogates from ordinary company law, there is no need to 
examine what the situation would be if that right were to give all shareholders, including private shareholders, 
an identical right of appointment.     The mere fact that the national legislature has included in the provisions of 
the Civil Code governing such companies a measure designed specifically to confer special powers on the State 
or a public body with a holding in a company limited by shares cannot remove that measure from the scope of 
application of Article 56 EC”. 
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1. any disproportionate power of the state and other public entity seems 
unacceptable from an European law’s standpoint, as such to discourage private investors; 
2. disproportionate powers risk to specifically sacrifice the economic interests of 
the private shareholders, i.e. their right to participate to the corporate profits on equal basis; 
3. it is immaterial whether the power at stake has a private or public law source, 
and so whether it may be defined as formally authoritative: the real point is whether the 
power at stake derives from a law provision that is applicable only to public entities; and this 
despite the fact that by means of ordinary instruments of private law (for example, 
shareholders agreements), it may be well possible to obtain similar privileges and that the 
source of the privilege is not an authoritative decision, but a private law act, like a 
corporation’s resolution40; 
4.  as a result of the judgment, in 200841, sect. 2449 of the civil code was amended, 
so to ensure that public authorities (in their capacity as shareholders) cannot directly appoint 
directors in such a way to exercise a disproportionate power on the corporation. In other 
terms, the proportionality principle between public authorities’ equity participations and 
influence on corporations has been expressly introduced into Italian law. 
    Of specific interest it is also the case C-326/07
42
, in which the ECJ declared 
inconsistent with European law the special powers conferred to the ministry of economy by 
the law-decree no. 474 of 1994, i.e. of the legislation that has mainly governed the process of 
privatization of SOCs in Italy. 
In fact, notwithstanding various attempts, by means of regulations issued by the 
government implementing the provisions of law-decree no. 474, to make more detailed, 
selective and certain the conditions under which the special powers could be exercised, in the 
court’s view, the legislative predetermination of the powers was not sufficiently detailed, 
giving to the government an excessive ambit of discretional power, in contrast with the 
                                                 
40
 Even more explicit the opinion of the Advocate General Poiares Maduro, delivered on 7 September 
2006, par. 19:  “In my opinion, the fact that the powers of appointment of the Comune di Milano are based on a 
provision of private law does not preclude the application of Article 56 EC. In that regard, it is worth noting 
that, for the purpose of determining whether the free movement of capital is restricted where the State enjoys 
special powers in an undertaking, it is immaterial how those powers are granted or what legal form they take. 
The fact that a Member State acts within the framework of its domestic company law does not mean that its 
special powers cannot constitute a restriction within the meaning of Article 56 EC. (4) Otherwise, Member 
States would easily be able to avoid the application of Article 56 EC, by using their position as incumbent 
shareholders to achieve within the framework of their civil laws what they would otherwise have achieved by 
using their regulatory powers” 
41
 Law no. 34 of 2008. 
42
  26 March 2009¸ Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic. 
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European requirement of making the golden share powers sufficiently legally certain, so to 
preserve the attractiveness of corporate investments within the European Union
43
. 
In sum, if , in relation to golden shares, we compare OECD guidelines and ECJ case-
law, we find  that both of them look with suspect at privileges conferred to the state as 
shareholder. However, the latter appears more radical in restricting the lawfulness of 
privileges to marginal situations, in which specific powers are strictly necessary and 
proportional. It does not seem casual, in this connection, that almost no national legislation 
on golden share proved to be accepted by ECJ, notwithstanding the fact that the concerned 
member states (among them Italy) had tried to make their laws as consistent as possible with 
a (by then) well established European case-law.  
Based on the above, this case-law represents a powerful, and probably the strongest, 
reason of preservation of the private and lucrative character of SOCs in Italy and in the 
European Union. 
In reality, there is almost no profile of  SOCs private law regime that is not, at least to 
a certain degree, potentially protected by the European (anti) golden share case-law. In 
particular, it seems sufficiently clear that no possibility exists, in the light of this position of 
the European judges, to admit that the rights of (existent or potential) private shareholders to 
a management of the corporation pursuant to sect. 2247 of Civil code (i.e., aimed at the 
maximization of the profitability of the enterprise) may be limited, with the result of giving a 
privilege to the public shareholder, as such.  
 
4. In house providing: toward a full (juridical) emersion of the substantial-
economic connections between state and state-owned corporations?. 
Under OECD guidelines “The government should not be involved in the day-to-day 
management of SOEs and allow them full operational autonomy to achieve their defined 
objectives”, and “The state should let SOE boards exercise their responsibilities and respect 
their independence”44.  In particular, “The boards of SOEs should be assigned a clear 
mandate and ultimate responsibility for the company’s performance. The board should be 
                                                 
43
 “Even if the criteria at issue concern different kinds of public interests, they are 
formulated in a general and imprecise manner. What is more, the lack of any connection 
between the criteria and the special powers to which they relate increases the uncertainty 
surrounding the circumstances in which those powers may be exercised and gives them a 
discretionary nature, having regard to the latitude enjoyed by the national authorities in 
making use of them. Such latitude is disproportionate in relation to the objectives pursued”. 
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fully accountable to the owners, act in the best interest of the company and treat all 
shareholders equitably”45. Moreover, “SOE boards should carry out their functions of 
monitoring of management and strategic guidance, subject to the objectives set by the 
government and the ownership entity. They should have the power to appoint and remove the 
CEO. The boards of SOEs should be composed so that they can exercise objective and 
independent judgement.”46.  
In sum, in OECD’s view, corporations should conserve their decisional autonomy, 
and a real management role of the board of directors has to be preserved. This in order to 
ensure that, even if subject to the strategic objectives indicated by the public shareholders, 
directors are not simply required to follow the instructions issued by the dominant 
shareholder. On the contrary, they need to pursue,  with independence of judgment, the best 
interest of all the shareholders, without discriminations between private and public interests. 
These principles lead us to another important development of the European law of 
SOCs: the case-law on in house providing. According to ECJ’s judgment on the case 
Teckal
47
,  as for the existence of a contract “the national court must determine whether there 
has been an agreement between two separate persons”, therefore “where the local authority 
exercises over the person concerned a control which is similar to that which it exercises over 
its own departments and, at the same time, that person carries out the essential part of its 
activities with the controlling local authority or authorities”, this fact would, per se, exclude 
the existence of a contract and so the requirement of a public tender.  
The theory at stake, initially developed in relation to an Italian public enterprise 
having the form of a public entity (a public law’s consortium among local authorities), then 
has been extended to public enterprises, in the form of private law corporations. As a 
consequence, it is clearly material for our analysis.  
However, with another judgment of 2005 regarding a corporation under the 
dominance of an Italian local authority
48
, the ECJ offered a prudential interpretation of the 
real possibility of qualifying as in house the relationship with a private law corporation. In 
particular, no similar control may exist, when, like in the case of the this corporation, the 
concerned entity is market-oriented. This “market orientation” may be identified where the 
following elements are present: 
                                                                                                                                                        
44
 Par. II, B and C, p. 13. 
45
 Par. VI.A., p. 17. 
46
 Par. VI.B-C, p. 17. 
47
 ECJ, 18 November 1999, C-107/98. 
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(a)      the fact of being a company limited by shares and the nature of this type of 
company (i.e., the fact in itself of being a private law corporation); 
(b)      the broadening of its objects, i.e. the fact of not being restricted, under by-laws, 
only to the public interest activities, specifically indicated by the municipality; 
(c)      the obligatory opening of the company, in the short term, to other capitals 
(private ones); 
(d)      the expansion of the geographical area of the company’s activities, to the whole 
of Italy and abroad; 
(e)      the considerable powers conferred on its board of directors, with in practice no 
management control by the municipality. 
Now, it is true that each of such features does not represent, per se, grounds by which 
excluding that an in house relationship may be at stake. However,  it seems undeniable that, 
at least, most of these features jointly considered, exclude, in the ECJ’s view, an in house 
relationship.  
What seems mostly interesting, now, is analyzing how these elements are common 
and frequent, in the factual and legal experience of Italian SOCs: 
a. the first element is present in the normality of the SOCs. We have already 
seen, in fact, that they generally belong to the realm of private law, being fully subject to the 
civil code, unless specifically provided for the contrary; 
b. on the second element, no doubt that the corporation’s object may be a clearly 
(and narrowly) defined. But, at the same time, it as well clear that, due to the implementation 
of the first EC directive on corporate law, the limitations to the corporation’s object, contrary 
to the ultra vires principle,  cannot be enforced toward third parties
49
. This means, in practice, 
that ultra vires acts are perfectly valid and enforceable, and that from an ultra vires act can 
simply  arise a reason of liability for the concerned director, where he lacks a proper 
authorizations from the shareholders to perform it; 
c. the obligatory opening to private investments is not a general feature (but has 
been and may be introduced by certain laws in view of accelerating the privatization process). 
However, unless specific law provisions establish the contrary, the shares possessed by public 
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 13 October 2005, Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen GmbH. v. Gemeinde Brixen and Stadtwerke Brixen 
AG. 
49
 Art. 9, par. 1, of directive 68/151/EEC: “Acts done by the organs of the company shall be binding 
upon it even if those acts are not within the objects of the company, unless such acts exceed the powers that the 
law confers or allows to be conferred on those organs”. 
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entities may be transferred without particular limitations. In other terms, it is always possible 
that shares are transferred to the private sector; 
d. also with regard to geographical limitations, they may be introduced, but 
without being enforceable against third parties (unless such limitations are specifically 
grounded on special legislative provisions
50
); 
e. as to the management powers and the role of the board, certain mandatory 
provisions of the civil code have to be mentioned. According to sect. 2380 bis, par. 1,  (at 
least in corporations limited by shares) the management powers are reserved to the board of 
directors, on which rests the ultimate liability for any act that unlawfully produce a damage to 
the corporation
51
; moreover, under sect. 2449, par. 2, of civil code, even the directors of 
SOCs who have been directly (i.e., without a resolution of the general meeting) appointed by 
the public entity have exactly the same duties and liabilities of the others, ordinarily 
appointed by the shareholders. In other terms, they are required to act in the general best 
interest of the corporation, as opposed to the specific one of the public shareholder and are 
not subject to specific powers of the dominant (public) shareholder.  
Specifically significant and directly related to Italy is also the case SEA, decided by 
the ECJ at the end of 2009
52
. There, ECJ observed that “In view of the extent of the 
supervisory and decision-making powers they confer on the committees they set up, and also 
of the fact that those committees are made up of representatives of the shareholder 
authorities, provisions laid down in statutes such as those of the contracting company 
involved in the main proceedings must be regarded as putting the shareholder authorities in 
a position to exercise, through those committees, conclusive influence on both the strategic 
objectives of the company and on its significant decisions”. However, while  the European 
judges recognized the potential relevance of such committees (established by the by-laws to 
implement the power of supervision to be exercised by local authorities), they also noted that 
“The court making the reference is, however, of the view that Articles 8 bis to 8 quater of 
Setco’s statutes, inasmuch as they refer to the joint and technical committees, are 
comparable to shareholders’ pacts falling within Article 2341 of the Italian Civil Code. It 
infers therefrom that the control similar to that which the shareholder authorities exercise 
over their own departments which the machinery of those committees is intended to attain 
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 Like, in the field of local services of general economic interest, art. 23 bis, law decree no. 112 of 
2008 and art, of law decree no. 223 of 2006.    
51
 Sect. 2380 bis, par. 1: “The management of the enterprise is exclusively reserved to the directors, 
who perform all the operations necessary to realize the corporations object”. 
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 ECJ, 10 September  2009, case C-573/07, Sea Srl. 
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might be ineffective”, concluding that it  “is a matter of the interpretation of rules of domestic 
law which it is for the court making the reference to settle” and so “Without prejudice to the 
determination by that court of the effectiveness of the relevant provisions of the statutes, it 
follows that, in circumstances such as those of the case in the main proceedings, the control 
exercised, through the bodies established under the company’s statutes, by the shareholder 
authorities may be regarded as enabling those authorities to exercise over that company 
control similar to that which they exercise over their own departments”. 
In other terms, ECJ seems to have held that the “similar control” requirement and then 
the connected alterations to the ordinary distribution of powers within the corporation need to 
be ensured by means of binding legal provisions, as opposed to a mere factual situations or 
even agreements that are enforceable only inter partes, i.e. that have a just relative (and not 
absolute, erga omnes) enforceability, like, for example, shareholders agreements. It does not 
suffice that, inter partes or, all the more, de facto, the most important management choices 
are reserved to the public entity-shareholder. This dominance is to be based on clear (and 
fully enforceable) legal powers. 
In sum, it seems that, in ECJ’s view, to create an in house relationship, the dominance 
exercised on the corporation has to be legally certain, but, at the same time, (much) more 
intense than that allowed under the common principles of corporate law
53
. 
But if this interpretation of the judgment is correct, it follows that no real in house 
providing relationships may actually exist in Italy. No doubt, in fact, that factual situations of 
(even deep or full) dominance may exist and, as a matter of fact, frequently exist in SOCs, 
but such situations are in contrast with the provision of the civil code and so of always 
debatable validity and, in any case, effective and enforceable only inter partes. In other 
words, they are not such to provide any (legally) certain dominance. 
These conclusions appear even more persuasive if we consider the interactions 
between, respectively, in house and golden share ECJ’s lines of decisions. And in fact, how 
an in house relationship can exist, when the fact in itself of conferring privileges to the State 
as shareholder in principle represents a violation of the freedom o circulation of capitals? In 
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 ECJ, 11 May 2006,  case C--340/04, Cabotermo, in Racc. I 4137 ss., especially point 38: “It is 
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other words, if it is true that as a condition to have an in house relationship, the dominance 
exercised on the corporation needs to be grounded on something different from the common 
principles of corporate law, how is this situation possible, in light of golden share case-law, 
that contrasts any alteration of common corporate law, in favor of the public shareholder? 
In this perspective, the only acceptable answer might turn out to be the following: at 
least in Italy, where SOCs are legally qualified (unless differently provided by specific laws) 
as real and autonomous enterprises, with a lucrative purpose and (a necessary) managing 
autonomy , the in house relationship appears difficult (if not impossible) to be recognized. 
This conclusion, although well consistent with the position in our view so far 
expressed by the ECJ, nonetheless does not appear fully satisfactory. 
In fact, the concept of in house has been created by the ECJ essentially on the basis 
and pursuant to the model offered by the concept of enterprise developed within European 
competition law. In this respect, in particular, it easy to agree that the public procurements 
law may be viewed as a special part of the competition law, for and insofar as it is intended to 
create a sort of “artificial” intra European Union competition, in markets, otherwise, tending 
to be closed to foreign undertakings. In particular, we have to make reference to the idea that, 
consistently with the American theory known as single enterprise theory
54
 (as opposed to the 
intra-enterprise conspiracies theory
55
), a group of corporations may represent, especially in 
relation to prohibitions of anticompetitive conspiracies, a single enterprise, as such not 
sanctionable, when the parent company coordinately decides the economic behavior of the 
subsidiaries
56
.     
Indeed, in a legal system that considers a group of corporations that are subject to a 
real guide and  economic coordination by the parent corporation substantially as a single 
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 USA Supreme Court, Copperweld Corp. V. Independence Tube Corp.,  467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984): 
“... the coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly subsidiary must viewed as that of a single enterprise for 
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conjunction with Article 2 and Article 3(c) and (g) of the Treaty. On the other hand, such unilateral conduct 
could fall under Article 86 of the Treaty if the conditions for its application were fulfilled”. 
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enterprise, it would be difficult to understand why the same should not be true as to the 
relationships among a public entity and a controlled corporation. In reality, on the contrary, in 
the relationships with public entities, to recognize the existence of an economic unity is even 
easier: especially in a system (like the Italian one) in which the law directly addresses the 
economic nature of the corporation (lucrative purpose, established by sect. 2247 of civil 
code), where a corporation is fully controlled by the public entity-shareholder and therefore is 
obliged to behave in contrast with its entrepreneurial  nature so that public-general objects-
interests prevail on its own egoistic (lucrative) purposes, it seems easy to conclude that the 
public entity and its subsidiary are an economic unity, without any appreciable economic 
separateness. In other terms, when the corporation nature is neutralized, then such a 
“denatured” enterprise represents no more than a department of the public entity, and so its 
distinct legal personality can easily be disregarded.    
 In such an approach, at least originally based on a substantial-economic perspective 
(as opposed to a formal-merely legal one), the current requirement, by the European judges, 
of a formal demonstration of the power of domination does not persuade: the domination, the 
group “hierarchic” relationship, should be, on the contrary, better considered as a (mainly) de 
facto situation, as opposed to something that needs to be certainly grounded on formal legal 
relationships
57
. Otherwise, in a similar formalistic approach, no group relationship might ever 
be found: under the ordinary corporate law, indeed, it would be almost impossible to justify 
why a subsidiary corporation might be obliged to follow the guidelines of the parent 
corporation. However, the absence of formal duties for subsidiaries corporations to recognize 
the dominance of the parent corporation has never prevented the ECJ from giving relevance 
to the group relationship.     
 
5. Preliminary conclusions. National, European and OECD principles: consistent 
views as to state-owned corporations’ nature and legal regime? 
It is time, now, to try to reach certain preliminary conclusions on the positions 
assumed, respectively, by Italian and European legal systems and OECD in respect to SOCs. 
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In doing so, we will also extend our analysis on national case-law, so to give a more 
comprehensive idea of the living law in Italy. 
Italian law presents, to a certain extent, a double-faced situation.  
As we have tried to show, the positive law seems, in sum, fairly clear: SOCs are 
governed by private-civil law (and, as a consequence, by the lucrative purpose established by 
sect. 2247 of civil code), unless otherwise laid down by special legislative provisions. Such 
(exceptional) provisions, however, especially in the light of the constitutional and European 
principles that we have mentioned and shortly investigated, should be identified prudentially. 
In other terms, the fact of attributing to SOCs, without the support of an unequivocal special 
legislative intention, a binding public interest purpose (such to compress their lucrative 
purpose: i.e. without  specifically and transparently compensation for the connected 
economic losses) and, thus, of qualifying them as having a public nature, seems legally 
incorrect, as well as a source of uncertainty (uncertainty, as we know, already opposed at 
European level, in the context of the golden share case-law). 
But what does it happen in the context of national case-law? Are decisions of Italian 
judges in general terms consistent with the mentioned legislative choices? 
In reality, the Courts trends are less clear than the legislative positions. Especially the 
administrative judges (probably as a reaction to the privatizations realized in the last 20 
years
58
 and whose merely formal character has been in many cases noted
59
,) tend to privilege 
a so called substantialist approach, in which they recognize a crucial (but not well explained 
as to its legal grounds) importance to the connections between the corporation and the 
dominant public entity. In doing so, they often assert the neutral nature of the SOCs and so 
their (at least partial) subjection to public interest purposes and public-administrative law
60
. 
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In other terms, in their view, the reasons of public interest that the activities exercised by 
SOCs involves seem to replace (at least partially) the lucrative purpose and so the SOCs are 
(and should be) governed by an hybrid set of rules, in which public law principles are due to 
play a very important role
61
. 
This line of case-law expresses a, per se, well understandable concern: avoiding that, 
by means of the use of private law corporations, public duties and guarantees are eluded. 
Particularly at risk, as noted by the OECD, are “the administrative controls”62, i.e. the 
internal controls and safeguards that are aimed to ensure the efficiency, impartiality and 
lawfulness of the activity of the administrations. However, the administrative courts, in our 
view, have not, so far, demonstrated a real capability of creating and following a consistent 
approach and, most of all, to provide a satisfactory explanation on when and at which 
conditions public law is due to prevail on private law: as a consequence, substantialist 
approaches have proved to obstruct the formation of general rules, so creating a too uncertain 
and unpredictable situation.  
In essence, even if we might cite also judgments, (especially of the ordinary courts) 
that recall and apply the legislative choices in terms of private nature of SOCs
63
, Italian law 
appears, at the same time, sufficiently clear (as to the legislation) and too unclear (due to the 
case-law, for it does not always follow the legislation, but introduces reasons of uncertainty, 
in the attempt of avoiding the elusion of public law through private forms of organization of 
the administrative activities). 
European law, again, expresses a general approach inclined to defend the subjection 
of SOCs to common-private law. In fact, once (and to the extent that is) ensured the full 
applicability of European law also where a SOC is involved in a given activity subject to 
European law vertical obligations (it is not permitted to use SOCs as means to elude 
European law duties, as well shown, in the field of public procurements, by the notion of 
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body governed by public law), then European law  mainly wishes to preserve the freedom of 
investment and so to keep attractive for investors shares of SOCs. To reach this primary 
purpose, there is no other choice but to fully preserve the rights (especially the economic 
ones) of the actual or potential private shareholders, prohibiting any privilege in favor of 
public shareholders. In such a way, the traditional approach of many European legal systems 
of conferring privileges to public shareholders is completely reversed. By contrast, public 
entities cannot be granted even of those special rights that, by means of  common-private law, 
could be well provided to private shareholders. 
In OECD guidelines, again, a primarily private-law approach emerges. In particular, 
the ordinary principles of corporate governance suggested by OECD are generally speaking 
extended also to SOCs (whose specific guidelines, in fact, “should build on, and be fully 
compatible with, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance”64, albeit OECD recognizes 
that SOCs “face some distinct governance challenges”65, in terms, typically, of “undue 
hands-on and politically motivated ownership interference…”66 and this is arguably the main 
reason why particular guidelines have been draft). But, obviously, the absence of a specific 
legal system to which making reference (by definition, the guidelines are intended to apply to 
different jurisdictions, in which the principles of corporate law can be even substantially 
different) makes OECD principles a bit undefined. In particular, it is not fully clear what it 
means exactly that corporations have to pursue the common interest of all the shareholders: 
are these common interests to be defined case by case by the by-laws, or are to be deemed 
necessarily coincident with the common economic interests of the shareholder, i.e. the 
profitability or, in any case, other common economic objectives? In other terms, to what 
extent interests different from the economic ones (common to all the shareholders) may be 
lawfully pursued, without a specific compensation? If one reads the draft of implementation 
paper issued in 2008  by the same OECD, he finds that the Organization recognizes that the 
various legal system are different (also) in this (essential) respect: “In some countries the 
governance is more or less identical to the governance of privately owned commercial 
companies. In other countries the governance is more tied to the owners’ political interests, 
especially when the plans of the specific SOE are decided or agreed in detail between the 
owner and the company. Regardless of the means by which the SOE Guidelines are 
implemented, it is essential that authorities always scrutinise the effectiveness and the 
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relative costs and benefits of alternative approaches”67.  But, if it is true what we have said 
about the centrality of the legal purpose in the reconstruction and interpretation of the legal 
regime and nature of a given entity, this uncertainty about the objectives of SOCs risks to 
represent a serious limitation. 
In sum, in this respect, Italian law appears more precise and (as a result) certain than 
both European law and OECD guidelines: it provides a clear and mandatory rule on the 
purpose that all the corporations and so also SOCs are (legally) required to pursue. Moreover, 
since such purpose is the duty to maximize a specific interest (the profitability-dividends to 
be distributed by the corporation to shareholders), it is able to offer, in addition, a not 
ambiguous and immediately applicable rule on how to balance this legal purpose with other 
possible ones: in reality, the latter can be lawfully  pursued only to a very limited extent, i.e. 
as long as they may be harmonized with the lucrative purpose. 
 
6. The identification between SOCs and the State and the application of public 
law: recognizing that under the veil of the legal personality a public entity is operating. 
It is time, now, to address a very important (albeit not specifically covered by the 
OECD guidelines, exclusively dedicated to the corporate governance of SOCs) profile of the 
legal issues that SOCs pose, especially in the perspective of a public lawyer: the role that 
public law may and should play in their legal regime. 
In fact, the circumstance that, under Italian law, SOCs are, as a matter of principle, 
lucrative and private law entities, does not exclude, in our view, the potential applicability of 
public law. In this respect, a preliminary clarification is due: for the purpose of this paper, 
public law is (narrowly) meant as the law applicable only to legal persons which are public 
entities; no doubt that, in an increasing number of cases, rules that belong to public law in a 
broader sense (basically, the law governing the exercise of the typical, public, activities of 
administrative authorities) are applicable also to private entities, insofar as they concretely 
exercise administrative activities and powers. For example, recently, the law on 
administrative procedure as been amended so to make it clear that, where exercising an 
administrative power, SOCs and other corporations in public entities’ hands, have to comply 
with the procedural guaranties
68
. Obviously, in relation to the rules applicable regardless the 
nature of the concerned entity but exclusively in relation to the nature of the activity in itself, 
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there is no need of disregarding the private personality of the SOCs is at stake.  Other rules, 
on the contrary, at least in their current interpretations, require that a public entity is at stake: 
for example, this seems to be the case of art. 97, last par., of constitution, that imposes public 
procedures to select public employees. This provision (intended to ensure the impartiality of 
the selection through the imposition of an administrative procedure as a legally required 
instrument of recruiting), in principle and unless otherwise provided by a specific law 
provision, does not govern the recruiting by private entities, even when involved in public 
activities or services or under a strict public control.
69
 
In particular, for the purpose of discussing the elusion of laws applicable only to 
public entities, it is worth starting from art. 97, par. 1, of constitution, according to which 
public administrations have to be organized in full compliance with legislative provisions. 
In the light of such constitutional principle, specifically in relation to the 
administrative organizations (and so also with regard to the use of corporations, as 
instruments of organization of the state), it is well clear that the legal system cannot accept 
any elusion-circumvention of public laws obligations and guarantees, by means of the use of 
private legal persons. 
But, more in general, the legal system cannot reasonably tolerate that the legal 
personality represent an instrument by which circumventing mandatory rules and principles. 
Otherwise, the principle of non-contradiction  (within the legal system) would be violated
70
. 
In particular, as well explained, for the first time, by the American case-law, in relation to a 
corporation used to circumvent the application of a mandatory rule, “[A] corporation will be 
looked as a legal entity as a general rule, and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; 
but, when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, 
protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of 
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persons”71. As subsequently reaffirmed by the USA Supreme Court, therefore, “corporate 
entities may be disregarded when used to subvert clear legislative intent”72.  
As a result, the legal system should address any form of fraudulent use of the legal 
personality of the corporation through (as primary and most direct reaction) disregarding the 
formal separateness between the corporation and its shareholders
73
.   
Thanks to this disregard, in case of SOCs, the corporation will be viewed as nothing 
but a department of the public entity-shareholder, and so all the mandatory rules that its 
establishment was aimed to elude are, ultimately, applied. 
In this connection, the real issue and challenge seem that of establishing at what 
conditions we may say that the corporation is used to circumvent public law obligations and 
therefore to be disregarded. And in fact, in Italy, the subjection of SOCs to private law is 
something absolutely normal and physiologic, as it is provided for by the civil code. So it 
would not be sharable a position that refuses in any case and a priori the subjection of SOCs 
to common-civil law. 
Nonetheless, we can identify situations in which the corporate veil can (and, we think, 
is due to) be disregarded: where there is a so clear and pervading domination of the public 
entity on a SOC, that it may be concluded that the SOC at stake represents a mere 
instrumentality of the public entity, whose substantial nature of lucrative enterprise has been 
concretely annihilated. This denaturizing of the normal corporate nature is in contrast with 
sect. 2247 of civil code and so it denounces the elusive use of the corporate veil. In other 
terms, the conditions to be met for considering a corporation a real corporation are not 
satisfied, and this may justify a disregard of the autonomous legal personality of the 
corporation in order (and to the extent necessary) to enforce mandatory public rules. 
In this respect, the American case-law appears of great interest. 
In particular, we can mention the decisions Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation
74
 of 1995 and First National Bank v. Banco para el Comercio exterior de Cuba 
of 1983
75
. 
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In the former judgment (by the American scholars usually classified as an expression 
of the State action doctrine
76
) after having noted that ““Amtrak was created by a special 
statute, explicitly for the furtherance of federal governmental goals. As we have described, 
six of the corporation's eight externally named directors (the ninth is named by a majority of 
the board itself) are appointed directly by the President of the United States - four of them 
(including the Secretary of Transportation) with the advice and consent of the Senate” and 
that Amtrak is subject to a federal government control such intense that the public 
shareholder acts “not as creditor, but as a policymaker”, the Court expressed the opinion 
according to which Amtrak should be subject to the constitutional duties imposed to federal 
agencies (and in particular to the first amendment of the American Constitution). And, it is 
worth noting, the judges reached this conclusion, albeit the federal act establishing the 
corporation expressly excluded a nature of Amtrak as a federal agency. However, in the view 
of the judges, “It is not for the Congress to make the final determination of Amtrak’s status as 
a government entities for purposes of determining the constitutional rights of citizens affected 
by its actions”. Otherwise, it would be even too easy to elude the constitutional safeguards77.  
This decision has influenced also state courts. 
In particular, the Supreme Court of Alaska
78
 declared the Alaska Railroad 
Corporation subject to certain constitutional obligations of transparence provided by the state 
constitution. In fact, in Alaska’s judges view, the  public notice clause79 has to be complied 
with by the SOC, notwithstanding the fact that the Alaska Railroad Corporation Act 
establishes the “legal existence independent of and separate from the state” of the 
corporation. However, in light of the circumstances that the Governor nominates almost all 
the director  and, above all, the corporation “is not in the temporary control of Alaska, as a 
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private corporation whose stock comes into [State] ownership might be”, but, on the 
contrary, it is in a permanent and stable state’s control, aimed at pursuing certain specific 
state’s objectives (“was created by the legislature to carry out the essential government 
function of operating the Alaska Railroad”), the public nature of the corporation was 
recognized  In fact, according to the Court, the SOC “remains, by its very nature, what the 
Constitution considers to be government” and so the legislator cannot exclude the subjection 
of the corporation to constitutional duties.  
Similarly, in the Bancec case, the Supreme Court held that a SOC in principle is to be 
deemed as a separate entity from the State-shareholder (“we agree with the court of appeals 
that there should be a presumption in favour of recognizing the juridical autonomy conferred 
upon foreign state-owned instrumentalities by their own law"). But, “"Although a 
corporation and its shareholders are deemed separate entities for most purposes, the 
corporate form may be disregarded in the interests of justice where it is used to defeat an 
overriding public policy. . .”. 
To understand whether in the concrete case an unlawful use of the corporation was at 
stake, the Court investigated the substantial-economic nature of the relationships between the 
Cuba government and the corporation
80
. 
In this respect, the fact that Bancec was wholly owned by the Government, with all 
the directors appointed, again, by the Government, one of whose ministers was the chairman 
of the corporation, convinced the Court to disregard its separateness from the State of Cuba
81
. 
Such American approaches appear in certain respect similar to the European in house 
doctrine. However, the in house doctrine, if it has certainly the merit of underling the 
importance of an investigation on economic-substantial profiles in order to reach a conclusion 
on the law applicable via an identification (or not) between corporation and public 
shareholder, it presents, as noted, also certain limitations. In fact, so far, as noted before, it 
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has showed a too rigid position, requiring a formal-legal grounded power of domination, that 
appears, in reality, incompatible with the principles of (at least Italian) corporate law. 
By contrast, American case-law seems more flexible and ready to accept that the 
transformation of public enterprises in something different (i.e. in mere departments of the 
dominant public administration) may well occur and, most of all, this transformation, even 
where in disputable coherence with corporate law and/or existing only de facto, needs to be 
effectively addressed. In particular, in such an event, an identification between the concerned 
corporation and the dominant, public, shareholder, is in the interest of the legality and of the 
full enforcement of public law guaranties.   
More delicate is, from certain standpoints, the reconstruction of the legal regime of 
SOCs established by a specific law or on the basis of it.  
At first, they may have the nature of a public entity, where the legislator 
(unequivocally) confers them a public interest purpose. This public interest purpose, 
combined with, in addition, the control exercised by the public entity as a shareholder, may 
well meet not only the condition to fall within the European law definition of body governed 
by public law, but also the requirements, that, traditionally, in Italy, have been proposed in 
the effort to qualify an entity as a one of a public nature: i.e., the facts of being legally 
mandated with a public interest purpose and of being linked by means of a formal 
relationship of control with a public entity. It would appear, in fact, too formalistic a theory 
according to which only forms of control through public law mechanisms are relevant in 
order to characterize an entity as a public law one.  In this connection, it does not seem 
surprising that, in a specific case, Italian legislator has already qualified a SOC as a public 
law’s corporation, i.e. as a public entity82.  
However, in the great majority of the cases, it is difficult to find sufficient legal 
indications such to conclude in the sense of the substitution of the lucrative purpose with a 
public interest one in SOCs established pursuant to a specific law. As a result, the non 
application of public laws appears established directly by the legislator, exactly like in 
relation to other SOCs.  Nonetheless, also in this case, mandatory public laws cannot be 
eluded through the separate legal personality of the corporation: thus, insofar as the SOC is 
improperly, in concrete, transformed in something different from a real, lucrative, enterprise, 
public laws are due to be applied, as a form of reaction of the legal system against an elusive 
use of the corporation form.  
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All the more, in case of SOCs established by or on the basis of a specific law, the 
constitutional provisions cannot be disregarded. And this is true for both the public 
administration (in the concrete exercise of its powers of dominant entity) and the legislator, 
wherever it establishes a SOC with such (unconstitutional) intention (or, in any case, effect). 
As well noted by the American courts, in fact, the legislator does not have the power 
to decide on the scope of application of constitutional duties and guaranties. So, unless being 
ready to admit a potentially extensive elusion of constitutional rules, where a SOC has the 
substance of a formal public entity (thanks to its, legally determined, pervasive submission to 
the dominant public entity, such to transform it in something different from a real and for 
profit enterprise), then the constitutional  guaranties should be fully applied. More in details,  
when it is clear that the intention of the legislator was to elude constitutional provisions, this 
should in principle represent a reason of unconstitutionality for the concerned legislative 
provision. Otherwise, when a so clear intention is not identifiable, the interpreter is due to 
prefer a construction according to which the legislator did not intend to, improperly, modify 
the constitutional status of a given SOC, as being aware of its lack of competence for 
addressing such profiles. Similar arguments can be extended to European law obligations, as 
also European Union’s rules are superordinate in respect to Italian law provisions. In the field 
of European law, in any case, and specifically as to public procurements, the notion of body 
governed by public law has exactly the primary rationale to prevent member state from 
eluding EU law, by means of SOCs (and other private legal persons), in reality substantially 
equivalent to public entities. But even when this notion does not apply, the ECJ is ready to 
consider, at certain conditions and for given purposes, SOCs equivalent to formal public 
bodies
83
.   
In Italy, Constitutional Court has already proved to deem that the constitutional status 
of SOCs may, at certain conditions, be the same of public bodies.  
In particular, the constitutional judges
84
 held that art. 97, last par., of constitution 
applies also to local authorities owned corporations, which, for being in a in house 
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relationship, are granted with a direct award of local public services’ concessions. A regional 
law, thus, may lawfully impose the duty to recruit employees by means of a public selection, 
since, by doing so, it is correctly implemented “the principle laid down by art. 97 of 
Constitution in relation to a corporation which, being fully owned by public entities, although 
formally private, may be assimilated, as to the legal regime, to public entities”. 
However, the position of the Constitutional Court is more complex: in a later 
judgment, it observed that SOCs belong, at least from a formal standpoint, to the realm of 
private law, even if they may be involved in administrative activities in a strict sense, meant 
as activities that do not present any entrepreneurial nature, not being subject to any form of 
competition
85
. Therefore, they may be defined, (but exclusively) from the standpoint of the 
activity performed (as opposed to their nature as legal persons), as quasi-administrations.  
More in general, to fully recognize, at certain conditions, that the state operates 
through a given SOCs may help to provide effective and proportional answers also to other 
important, global, issues.  
For example, as to SWFs, they seem to raise concerns essentially insofar as used to 
pursue strategic-political (as opposed to genuinely economic- entrepreneurial) aims. As 
already noted
86
, in fact, real concerns do not arise where SWFs invest with the mere purpose 
of maximizing their profit (like any other private investor), but where they invest in strategic 
activities, regardless  the economic rationality of the investment.  
In this perspective, SWFs could be identified and treated as equivalent to foreign 
states, and, thus, subject to the same legal limitations to investments hypothetically applicable 
to foreign states, if and to the extent that their concrete economic behavior proves to be 
politically-strategically (instead of economically) driven. In a similar scenario, in fact the 
very circumstance that a given SWF performs investments politically driven may denounce, 
at the same time, its lack of real economic-entrepreneurial autonomy from the state and the 
risk that, through the formal separateness of the SWF from the foreign state-dominant 
shareholder, this latter eludes the limitations to investments, which are established by the 
concerned legal system. 
 
7. Conclusions: a legal regime in search of a higher degree of certainty; to what 
extent a global regulation of SOCs is of use? 
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In Italy, the legal regime of SOCs has always been discussed and difficult to be 
satisfactorily defined. This is probably due to the almost unsolvable contradiction between 
the for profit purpose generally assigned by sect. 2247 of civil code and the public interest 
that, at least to a certain extent, it is difficult to deny to be the main motive why a public 
entity may set up and then dominate the corporation. As noted by an Italian scholar, SOCs 
represent, in themselves, an “insincere formula” 87. 
 However, two main lines of evolution seem identifiable both in Europe and in Italy.  
At first, a tendency to better safeguard the private law nature of SOCs. In other terms, 
also thanks to OECD guidelines, it is by now widely accepted the idea that a corporatization 
which does not involve a real (formal) privatization represents a (even more) insincere 
formula, whose legal and economic rationality is hard to understand. 
For example, as to in house corporations, why using the corporate form with the 
complications that the mandatory rules of corporate law create, when, traditionally, Italian 
law knows public entity specifically mandated to exercise entrepreneurial activities and 
whose full “instrumentality” to public interest has never been doubted88?   
Secondly, a growing awareness that, albeit SOCs are generally governed by private 
law, they cannot become an instrument of elusion of public law. 
This concern has been and may be addressed in various ways: 
- by disregarding the veil of legal personality, so to identify the public 
entity, which acts through the corporation; 
- by qualifying SOCs as, substantially or even formally, public entities, 
that, as such, are naturally subject to the (full) application of public law;  
- by introducing “public law” rules that are applicable regardless the 
private or public law nature of the subject at stake. 
Obviously all the three systems may be of use and contribute to a reasonable and 
balanced legal regime of SOCs. 
For example, in this respect, the American state action doctrine seems to fall into both 
the first and the last of the above categories: on a side, the specific connection that grounds 
the application of the state action’s doctrine can be represented by a particularly intense 
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corporate control by the federal or state government
89
; on the other side, also the nature of the 
activity at stake can, at certain condition, per se justify the application of constitutional 
guarantees.   
However, for the purpose of ensuring an acceptable level of legal certainty, what 
should be certainly avoided is a too confused situation. Deciding the applicable legal regime 
case by case, in fact, while it may ensure a higher level of flexibility, risks to prevent citizens 
from knowing in advance which laws are applicable . 
In this respect, in our view, to ensure a good compromise between legal flexibility, 
full enforcement of public law and legal certainty, a  way could be the following: 
- at first, to clarify what are, according to the principle of the concerned 
legal system, the definition of public entity and the rules applicable only to public 
entity (public law in a strict sense).  
- secondly, to define what are, in abstract terms, the conditions that the 
definition of corporation requires to be met: for example, in Italy, a really 
entrepreneurial and lucrative activity.  
- thirdly, to analyze the SOC concretely at stake in the light of such 
definitions, so to understand whether its legislative provision falls within the 
category of public entity, or, while being governed only by civil code (and so in 
principle being a private law entity), it has been concretely used in way 
inconsistent with its legal nature, i.e. substantially transformed in a department of 
the dominant public administration; 
- lastly, where the SOC is a public entity or has been used in a way 
inconsistent with its legal nature, to apply, for both the internal organization-
activities and the external ones, public laws. 
In sum, in the efforts to safeguard the enforcement of public laws, the distinction 
between corporations and public entities, contrary to what too often happens in Italian case-
law,  should not be denied or attenuated. On the contrary, in our opinion, only once the 
distinction between the two different categories is fully appreciated, it is possible to 
effectively understand whether, in a given and concrete case, a SOC has been used in a way 
incompatible with its nature and with the aim of eluding mandatory public law provisions. By 
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contrast, when the boundaries between the different categories are undefined, ensuring an 
acceptable level of legal certainty is, inevitably, an harder task.      
Alternatively, to offer an acceptable level of certainty, public laws in a strict sense 
might be replaced, by the legislator, with rules which apply only on the basis of the activity at 
stake (whether of specific public interest and/or clearly incompatible with an entrepreneurial 
management), or, alternatively, with rules which, while still based on the subject at stake as 
opposed to the activity, are expressly extended also to SOCs and other enterprises in public 
hands.  
But this evolution appears  far from being completed and, as to an extension of public 
laws to SOCs, in contrast with the civil code’s provisions currently in force, according to 
which, on the contrary, the full application of private laws to SOCs  should represent a 
general and prevailing principle. 
It is certainly shareable that, as particularly held by the ECJ in the case Meroni v. 
High Authority of 1958
90
, delegation to private entities of the exercise of public activities 
cannot result in a reduction of the guarantees  provided by the legal system vis-à-vis public-
authoritative powers. In fact, no delegation of powers more intense than those possessed by 
the delegating authority (whose powers are limited by the very existence of public law 
guaranties) is (legally and logically) admissible. However, this convincing principle is 
difficult to apply in relation to guaranties that regard the internal organization of the public 
entities and other instrumental activities, as opposed to powers directly enforceable toward 
private citizens. In such a latter case, in fact, the point is more that of understanding whether 
a given organizational form complies with its condition of existence, or, on the contrary, is 
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intended to escape from certain mandatory rules, whose formal condition of application is the 
public nature of the concerned entity. 
In conclusion, to recognize - as consistently suggested, although with different level 
of clarity and intensity, by OECD guidelines, European law and Italian civil code - that the 
legal regime of SOCs belongs, in principle, to the realm of private law, seems one of the steps 
to avoid, in conformity with the case-law of ECJ expressed in the case case Meroni, that the 
delegation (or exercise) of public activities through SOCs may affect the role of public law 
guarantees, and, in such a way, the internal coherence of the legal system . 
The above remarks lead us to a final comment on the usefulness of OECD guidelines, 
and, more in general, of a global regulation in this field. 
If it is true that, as we have tried to demonstrate thanks to the example represent by 
the Italian system, the legal purpose of a SOC, where, like in Italy, legally established in 
terms of maximization of the profits to be distributed to shareholders, is such to characterize 
its full nature (i.e., also its substantial features, as opposed to its mere and formal legal 
regime); in particular, if it is true that such element is capable of directly conditioning the 
entire legal regime of SOCs, in terms both of internal organization-corporate governance and 
laws applicable to the external activities, a conclusion seem possible.  
As demonstrated by OECD guidelines, probably any global regulation tend to be at 
the same time weak and narrow. 
Weak, because the main issue of corporate governance, and especially of corporate 
governance of SOCs, i.e. the regulation of conflicts of interest within the corporation, cannot 
be effectively (and consistently) addressed without having clearly in mind which is the legal 
requirement governing the corporations’ purpose: for example, inevitably, it is substantially 
different to state that public interest obligations and duties are to be pursued in a transparent 
way, in a legal system in which the lucrative purpose applies to SOCs, as opposed to one in 
which, on the contrary, the circumstance that the corporation is under the dominance of a 
public entity transforms, at least partly, its legal purpose or even its nature as public or private 
entity. As a consequence, the same real chances of the OECD guidelines to influence in a 
uniform way the corporate governance of SOCs in distinct jurisdictions risks to be affected 
by the differences among the various legal systems in relation to the legal purpose and nature 
of SOCs.  
Too narrow, because only having in mind the formal and substantial nature of SOCs, 
in our view, it is possible to understand when and to which extent the internal coherence of 
the legal system requires to apply public laws to a given SOC. And in order to understand 
 39 
this nature, as we hope to have shown in relation to Italy, it seems necessary to analytically 
study each legal system, avoiding preconceived ideas (SOCs may be fully private entities or, 
on the contrary, fully public entities, or private entities that, at certain conditions, are subject 
to public law. It depends on the positive choices of the national legislator).  
 In sum, are OECD guidelines useless? This would be an exaggerated conclusion: they 
have the merit of proposing a private law and entrepreneurial view of SOCs. And, as 
observed above, this represents not only a position in line with Italian as well as European 
law, but also such to help to reach, at a global level, a conceptual clarification on the nature 
and legal regime of SOCs. In essence, although with the limitations we have discussed, if 
concretely applied, the guidelines may give a contribution in the direction of a more effective 
legal regime for SOCs.  
   
 
  
